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Genung‟s Theory of Persuasion:
A Literary Theory of Oratory of Late Nineteenth-Century America

Abstract

John Genung‟s late nineteenth century rhetoric textbooks, although
founded on an eighteenth century model of Scottish composition, present an
original conception of oratory. Genung‟s theory breaks free of the classical
models and lays out the path to be followed during the development of speech
studies among American rhetoricians of the early twentieth century.
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Genung‟s Theory of Persuasion:
A Literary Theory of Oratory of Late Nineteenth-Century America

John F. Genung‟s (1887) The Practical Elements of Rhetoric with Illustrative
Examples, a North American rhetoric manual of the late nineteenth century,
represents the literary approach to rhetorical studies that was typical of that era.
Influenced by the Belles Lettres tradition in rhetoric, Genung‟s book is more
reminiscent of the Ramistic heritage of rhetorical studies than of the Ciceronian,
if one may make such a distinction, for Genung often treats oratory as a species
of literature that in some ways is subordinate to writing. Although cloaked in
faculty psychology, his ideas unmistakably foreshadow approaches to public
speaking that are, a century later, routinely taught in most college public
speaking courses.
In this and a revised work, The Working Principles of Rhetoric, Genung
(1900) presents in germinal form more of the concepts of rhetoric that dominated
twentieth century approaches to public speaking. At the same time, Genung‟s
work represents a tradition against which rhetorical scholars interested in
oratory would soon rebel. It is difficult to overestimate the influence of Genung‟s
approach to rhetoric, an influence that developed, in part, as direct impact on
rhetorical thought, and in part, as the stimulus for reaction.
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Too often, one takes the academic approaches of the present day for
granted. Genung‟s work contributed to a North American approach to academic
rhetoric. His Practical Elements dominated composition education near the end of
the nineteenth century (Berlin 1984, 75; Connors 1997, 132). Genung‟s work was
cited even after it passed out of print, to the point that Thonssen included some
brief selections from Genung in a 1942 anthology of readings about rhetoric
(Thonssen 1942, 311-314). Like many things American, Genung‟s work blazes a
new path, one that would eventually but indirectly lead to the distinctly American
tradition of rhetorical studies, founded in but advancing beyond the ancient
theories, that would emerge a few decades later.
Genung (1887) defines rhetoric as “the art of adapting discourse, in
harmony with its subject and occasion, to the requirements of a reader or hearer”
(1). Genung‟s (1887) book mostly treats rhetoric as a matter of organization (248300) and language style (13-214)—as dispositio and elocutio, although he employs
no such terms. He covers invention under several chapter titles; for example,
“Invention dealing with Observed Objects” (Genung 1887, 326-354). Much of
what he calls invention, however, a later rhetorician might treat as disposition;
for example, Genung (1887) treats narration under invention (355-383). These
attitudes of Genung‟s make the brief discussions of oratory, argumentation, and
persuasion that he tucks in the back of his textbooks even more intriguing. It is
upon these latter sections that this essay concentrates.
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Anyone who scans an American composition textbook of, say, the 1960‟s,
will easily see many ways, large and small, in which it reflects ideas such as
Genung‟s. Berlin characterizes Genung‟s aim as to rework rhetorical education,
particularly composition education, to free it from the classical models.
Nonetheless, Berlin argues that Genung did not free himself from the influence
of Blair, Campbell, and Whately. Instead, Genung found himself mired in an
eighteenth century model of composition. Berlin (1981) also notes Genung‟s
reliance on an outdated faculty psychology (74-75, 82-83). Berlin (1984) argues
that writing instruction in the United States in general rebelled against English
models of education (6-7). This may account for the turn toward the Scottish
rhetoricians, Blair and Campbell (Berlin 1984, 62-63). Berlin (1984) feels that
writing instructors of the late nineteenth century abandoned the classical model
“partly because it was grounded in a noetic field that was being repudiated
everywhere, but nowhere with such fervor as in America” (6). Although John
Quincy Adams‟ work, grounded in the Aristotelian tradition, had been
published, it had little influence in the face of this massive rejection of the old
models (Berlin 1984, 15). Adams stressed that “The peculiar and highest
characteristic, which distinguishes man from the rest of the animal kingdom, is
REASON”

(Adams 1801, 1:13-14). Berlin may be right that rhetorical theorists of

the late nineteenth century were deliberately rebelling against such rationalistic
theories (Berlin 1984, 13-17).
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Summarizing Genung‟s approach to rhetoric, Cohen (1994) notes
Genung‟s definition of rhetoric as encompassing the spoken and written word,
Genung‟s acceptance of the definition between conviction and persuasion, and
his reliance on a faculty psychology (18-20). Whately (1846) developed an
influential theory of rhetoric founded on faculty psychology. Whately divides his
book into sections on the appeals to the understanding and the appeals to the
will, as well as style and delivery. Genung‟s textbooks appear to follow this
pattern, although Genung (1887) greatly amplifies the discussion of style, while
slighting delivery.
The Ciceronian tradition in rhetoric encompasses the five canons of
invention, arrangement, elocution, delivery, and memory. One does, of course,
find evidence of these canons in the work of various ancient writers, including
the Rhetorica Ad Herennium (Kennedy 1972, 110-112), and these authors may have
drawn on a further tradition, perhaps an oral one (Kennedy 1972, 126-138).
One might look to Peter Ramus, however, in order to take in the
viewpoint of Genung‟s work. The idea behind Ramus‟ reforms of education was
to divide learning into various distinct areas of study, each area to fall under a
specialty. Ramus (1986) complained against Quintilian, for example, that
“Quintilian follows Aristotle‟s and Cicero‟s confusion of dialectic and rhetoric”
(80). Ramus (1986) continues that Quintilian threw into his study of rhetoric
almost every other subject as well (80). This moved Ramus to limit rhetoric to
delivery and stylistic ornament (Ramus 1986, 86; Ramus 1969, 55). In Lanham‟s
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(1993) interesting perception, Ramus made rhetoric into one of the “cosmetic
arts,” independent of philosophical ideas (157).
In no way did Ramus anticipate that a student would be exposed to one
subject only, to the exclusion of others. Unfortunately, perhaps, but predictably,
students quickly began to specialize just like their professors (Howell 1956, 146155). Over the centuries, scholars of language sometimes taught their field as if it
were rhetoric entire, excluding from their examination such matters as argument,
or how to present an oral argument to a live audience.
Blair often seems to fall into this tradition, but it is entirely unclear that
Blair himself was ever as limited in his view of rhetoric as were his followers. He
certainly understands that style is only a part of persuasion:
For, according as society improves and flourishes, men acquire more
influence over one another by means of reasoning and discourse; and in
proportion as that influence is felt to enlarge, it must follow, as a natural
consequence, that they will bestow more care upon the methods of
expression their conceptions with propriety and eloquence. (Blair 1861, 910)
Blair recognizes that style could never be all of rhetoric; it is simply the area of
rhetoric that interests him. Unfortunately, it became all too easy for rhetoric
manuals of the late 1800‟s, following in Blair‟s tradition, to slight audience
analysis, speech content, and delivery, all of which are likewise essential to
effective spoken rhetoric.
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Genung did not follow Ramus‟ system, but was Ramistic in the sense that
he did not reassemble and integrate the canons. He still envisioned rhetoric as in
large part the study of style. His faculty psychology led him to treat one canon of
rhetoric as an appeal to one faculty, and a different canon as an appeal to some
other faculty. He did, however, look toward the twentieth century by moving
toward a more comprehensive study of rhetoric that included invention and
arrangement. The discussion of oral persuasion seemed like an afterthought,
being confined to a small section near the back of his books, but nonetheless
represented a positive step toward the resurgence of oratorical studies of the
early twentieth century. In his discussion of persuasion, Genung attempted to
revert to a more comprehensive view of oratory. He carefully examined the
manner in which an orator would interact with and persuade an audience, but
did so in a way that reflected little awareness of the learning embodied in
rhetoric manuals in the Ciceronian tradition.
Unlike a rhetorical theorist of a hundred years later (or, perhaps, earlier),
Genung takes the position that persuasion is concerned with “truths, but truths
of a particular kind.” Where argumentation tests the truth of a writer‟s claims,
persuasion investigates truths that are “practical” or “personal.” “In a word,”
writes Genung, “the whole sphere of duty, interest, privilege, happiness,
conduct, is open to the work of persuasion” (Genung 1887, 447). This perspective
immediately prevents Genung from addressing persuasion as involving a
combination of several arts comparable to the canons of rhetoric. Guided by
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faculty psychology, Genung has trouble coming to terms with the possibility that
expository writing could be persuasive, for example, or that persuasive oratory
could be informative. This is clearest when he comments that “Persuasion is so
predominantly the work of oral communication, it so almost necessarily requires
the close contact of personal presence. [. . .] Persuasion presupposes a speaker at
close quarters with his audience” (Genung 1887, 449).
Genung‟s examination of persuasion thus takes the perspective of the
speaker rather than the writer. Persuasion tries “to make the hearer see and feel
that his interest and duty lie in the adoption of a certain prescribed line of
conduct or belief” (Genung 1887, 456). He stresses as the first principle of
persuasion the “alliance” between the speaker and audience. The speaker seeks
to “enlist their sympathies and energies in a common cause with him” (Genung
1887, 449). Genung briefly examines credibility, suggesting that a speaker must
establish the trust and respect of the audience, doing so “with a manly, selfrespecting frankness.” The speaker should “approach his audience as men
occupying a common ground with himself, as having rights, abilities, opinions,
that are to be respected and conciliated” (Genung 1887, 449).
As a further principle, Genung (1887) stresses the importance of the
absence of “the appearance of any kind of artifice” and of adapting to the
audience (450). This requires, in Genung‟s (1887) view, “an intuitive knowledge
of men.” This intuitive knowledge, Genung implies, is to be found by studying
the audience members‟ physiques (Genung 1887, 452). He quotes favorably from
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Henry Ward Beecher‟s explanation of the importance of being aware of the size
of an audience member‟s brow, the shape of his head, the texture of the hair, and
the height of the forehead. Indeed, advancing beyond mere phrenology, the
lengthy quotation from Beecher also explains the importance of analyzing an
audience member‟s stomach, which organ reflects the person‟s “natural forces.”
All of these, one is led to believe, reflect the construction of a person‟s brain and
therefore offer the speaker information about the person‟s temperament (Genung
1887, 452-453).
Then again, Genung recognizes that the aim of persuasion is “the
achievement of an object” rather than to expound eloquently on a topic. Thus,
developing his faculty psychology, Genung (1887) divides persuasion into the
“address to the intellect” (456-459), the “address to the feelings” 459-463), and the
“address to the will” (463-468). He judges the address to the intellect to be
indispensable to effective persuasion. However, this, “so far is it is merely
thought,” cannot lead the audience to action (Genung 1887, 457). Genung (1887)
urges that argumentation is more important in the address to the intellect than is
narrative (458). He advises speakers to make the address to the intellect with
“simplicity,” “plainness,” and “directness” (458).
Moving to the feelings, Genung (1887) suggests that appeals to the
emotions are necessary to move human beings from their natural state of
lethargy. He compares the orator‟s appeal to the emotions to “overcoming
inertia” (Genung 1887, 459). Genung quotes Marc Antony‟s funeral oration for
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Julius Caesar, from Shakespeare‟s play, as an admirable example of an orator‟s
appeal to the emotions. Genung‟s treatment does not show clear awareness that
Shakespeare‟s account of this speech is fictionalized: “The value of this
knowledge of human nature, and of the considerations that will be most potent
with the hearers, is strikingly illustrated in the speeches of Brutus and Antony, in
Shakespeare‟s „Julius Caesar” (Genung 1887, 454). Thus, despite his attempt to
differentiate between oratory and other literature, Genung‟s predispositions
seem to forbid him from making the distinction in a clear, consistent manner.
Speakers make the address to the feelings with “language, voice, and action”
(Genung 1887, 559). This contrasts with the plain style used for the address to the
intellect. It also implies, consistent with the faculty psychology, that the appeals
are distinct; Genung does not seem to conceive of making a simultaneous appeal
to the intellect and appeal to the feelings. His methods for these appeals differ
enough to be incompatible.
Genung‟s discussion of the feelings remains vague. Unlike the typical
writer of earlier rhetoric manuals, Genung makes no attempt to catalogue
different emotions, and he does not advise the persuader which emotions are to
be used under what circumstances. He does stress that a skilled speaker—and
here Genung has the speaker rather than the writer in mind—must stimulate the
emotions without showing too much emotion in giving the speech. He therefore
warns against extravagant use of language (Genung 1887, 461-462).
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Last in Genung‟s list of faculties is the will. The appeal to the will, Genung
(1887) stresses, is the ultimate and distinguishing character of persuasive
discourse. Presaging Kenneth Burke by a half-century, Genung states that the
speaker must identify with and appeal to the audience‟s “motives.” The motives
are an intermediate factor between the audience‟s emotions and the audience‟s
actions. Genung explains that “men cannot escape them, nor is it in the power of
the soul deliberately to forswear them.” In a note, he says that “in the universal
practical mind of men, motiveless ideas either belong to the irresponsible
vagaries of madness, or are the mere riot of invention” (Genung 1887, 464).
Not forsaking moral issues, Genung (1887) briefly dismisses evil motives
with the offhand comment that any cause using evil motives would be led to
“deserved destruction” (464). This noble sentiment was, perhaps, more plausible
in the era before Hitler‟s brilliantly successful rhetoric. Genung does not
catalogue the motives, but offers three categories into which they might fall:

Duty to ourselves,—
self-respect, prudence reputation, integrity, and the like;
Duty to our kind,—
which includes also duty to country and common weal;
Duty to God,—
which comprises the highest and worthiest spiritual virtues.
(Genung 1887, 465)
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This system reflects the typical morality of late nineteenth-century America. Yet
in no way is it intended to be a complete list, as shortly afterwards Genung gives
examples of motives that do not clearly fall into any of these categories, for
example, the pecuniary motive (see Genung 1887, 467).
Genung (1887) promptly offers examples of various speeches employing
various motives; these include quotations from Macauley (465), Edmund Burke
(466), and Charles James Fox (467). Genung (1887) uses these to explicate various
practical aspects of motive appeals, explaining that “the proposed action must be
so placed before them as to coincide with their own desires and interests” (464).
He stresses that appeals “to the will” must be implicit; otherwise “it is too much
like compulsion.” Indeed, he remarks that “it is futile not to base conduct or
proposed action on motive (464).
Genung (1887) also discusses invective as a motive appeal (466). He does,
however, put a positive spin on invective. He defines invective as “appeal in
negative” and suggests that it can be used to shame an audience into acting on
their higher motives: “Just as one may appeal to justice, patriotism, honest,
benevolence, so he may inveigh against wrong, cowardice, meanness,
selfishness” (Genung 1887, 466). Continuing to advocate high-mindedness,
Genung (1887) advises that “the wise orator, therefore, who can seize the
occasion, will seek to base his cause on motives that are both good and practical”
(468).
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One notices through the above discussion Genung‟s increasing reliance on
concepts of oral discourse. This becomes explicit in the very last section of
Practical Elements, which looks at oratory. Genung (1887) also reiterates that “the
form that persuasion takes in literature, being almost altogether oral address, is
oratory” (468). Here, Genung clarifies that oratory is a branch of literature, and
yet of a different purpose than written literature.
Genung analyzes several characteristics of oratory. The first of these is
eloquence, which Genung explains in a subhead as “the Sum of the Oratoric
Style.” He hesitantly categorizes eloquence “as impassioned prose.” He
continues that “to true eloquence so many things are essential—the character of
the orator, his skill in swaying the emotions and sentiments of an audience, the
greatness of subject and occasion—that a brief definition is impossible” (Genung
1887, 469).
Genung stresses that eloquence does not require a high style. Instead, “it
is simply wise to take advantage of occasion.” He points out certain sorts of
figures that are inappropriate in spoken style. Presaging Winans‟ view that
public speaking is like conversation (Winans 1917, 20-25), Genung states the ideal
of eloquence to be “dignified conversation, grappling closely and earnestly with
the important issues of life.” Furthermore, he distinguishes the practical impulse
of oratory, pointing out that even great flourishes of eloquence are “still at the
impulsion of a practical end” (Genung 1887, 470-471). In this comment, Genung
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foreshadows Wichelns‟ insistence that the purpose of oratory is not beauty but
effect (Wichelns 1925, 209).
Genung (1887) advocates that speakers should offer simple arguments
“wherein there is only one step from premise to conclusion” and that example
and analogy are most typical of oratory. He insists that an argument in an
oration should be offered with “its own practical application” (472).
Genung (1887) concludes Practical Elements with a classification of the
different sorts of orations. One could certainly argue that Aristotle‟s three genres,
the demonstrative, forensic, and epideictic, reflect the common practices of
Athenian oratory (as Kennedy 1991 suggests, 7-9). Genung‟s classification, which
appears to be at least in part original, reflects what he perceives to be the most
common kinds of oratory of his time and place. The first of his two categories,
“determinate oratory,” is that which “contemplates direct and immediate action
as its result.” He divides determinate oratory into “oratory of the law, or forensic
oratory,” which “is concerned with the general end of justice and right.” The
second type of determinate oratory is “the oratory of legislative assemblies.” He
seems to deplore that “parliamentary debate is becoming more and more a
matter of business.” Political speaking, in Genung‟s view, is a sub-classification
of legislative oratory, although “sometimes more fiery and ambitious.” Also in
the category of determinate oratory is “Oratory of the pulpit,” which “is
concerned with the general end of inducing men to follow Christ.” Such oratory,
Genung advises, should not “wander too far from a definite and immediate
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issue” lest it lose its effect (472-473). Genung ignores non-Christian religious
oratory.
Genung‟s second category is “demonstrative oratory,” which is “that class
of orations wherein no defined end is directly proposed,” but which attempts to
uplift the audience “toward noble, patriotic, and honorable sentiments, and
toward a large and worthy life.” He refers to such standard examples of
epideictic oratory as Webster‟s Bunker Hill oration and Everett‟s speech on
Washington (Genung 1887, 473). Genung‟s views on demonstrative oratory are
surprisingly modern. He says that demonstrative oratory “is, or may be made, a
great educator” (Genung 1887, 473-474; cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1960,
49-51). Genung says that the voters often need to be reminded of the loftier
sentiments as they choose on public matters. Alas, Genung concludes that “the
work is now mostly done by journalism; but the orator‟s field is by no means
closed, nor will it be, so long as men delight in the living voice, the warmth of
eloquence, and the presence of influential men” (Genung 1887, 474). Thus, even
in his praise of demonstrative oratory, Genung‟s gaze seemed to turn, in ever so
subtle a manner, more to the written than to the oral. That is, he seemed to hold
that the newspapers and magazines were performing the function of the orator,
while still not being prepared to concede that oral discourse had lost either its
importance or its aesthetic quality.
In his later work, Working Principles of Rhetoric, Genung (1900) revises his
view of oratory. An interesting distinction is that he reorganizes the discussion to
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consider oratory into a chapter about argumentation. He characterizes oratory as
“the summit and crown of the rhetorical art” (642). He defines oratory as “public
discourse of the argumentative type, in which truth of personal import and issue
is presented and enforced” (642). He still holds to the view that oratory concerns
matters “of personal import” (643). He indicates that oratory belongs to the
“literary type” of argumentation. Since it is argumentation of “a modified, more
impassioned character,” one can call it “persuasion” (643).
Genung (1900) continues to rely on faculty psychology, distinguishing
between “The Appeal to the Intellect” (651), “The Appeal to the Emotions” (654),
and “The Appeal to the Will” (657). He advocates that an orator must appeal to
the will “indirectly” by appealing to the audience‟s motives (Genung 1900, 658).
By this time, Genung‟s (1900) concept of audience analysis has become
more sophisticated. Abandoning the study of the audience member‟s physique,
he further develops the importance of an “alliance” with the audience (Genung
1900, 645). He concludes that “An accomplished orator has by native
endowment, and heightens by determinate culture, a power to read his audience,
and to adapt himself instinctively to them.” He states, furthermore, that the
methods of understanding an audience involve “a magnetism, which cannot be
acquired by rule and whose source is not fully understood” (Genung 1900, 647).
It is difficult to imagine a student of Cicero or Quintilian making such an
admission, which, for all practical purposes, forsakes any attempt at a theory of
audience analysis. Cicero (1999) does, of course, note the importance of natural
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ability in the orator‟s development (sec. 122-123, p. 85). Thus, although Genung
offers some excellent advice to the speaker, that advice did not include specific
tools.
Developing an understanding of the audience, Genung, however, asserts
the importance of a simple style that suits “popular apprehension.” Genung‟s
(1900) “ideal” requires the speaker “to use up as little of the hearer‟s energy as
possible in merely understanding” (653). He also points out the benefit of
repetition. Although they show little respect for the audience, these comments
foreshadow the conversational approach to public speaking education. Most
interestingly, in this later version, Genung perceives more precisely the
importance of argumentation and exposition as fundamental to oratory (652653). Realizing the importance of credibility, Genung (1900) writes that “the
initiative . . . must be such as to inspire confidence both in him as an able and
honest man, and in his subject as he presents it” (646).
Genung‟s view, especially prominent in his earlier work, that written
literature is typically expository while spoken literature is typically persuasive
seems quite strange a century later. Under the influence of Kenneth Burke, many
modern rhetoricians see all forms of human discourse, including essays, poems,
and even quite exotic events, as being rhetorical in one sense or other (see, e.g.,
Burke 1969, 9-10, 116-123). Genung clearly recognizes the importance of
persuasion, audience analysis, and the like, but employs minimal scholarly tools
to develop them theoretically or pedagogically. This was both bad and good: bad
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because it deprives the student of the techniques necessary for effective public
speaking, but good, to a degree, because Genung started the task of developing a
uniquely North American framework for oratory unimpeded by ancient models.
Although his discussion of oratory displays knowledge of Whately‟s
Elements of Rhetoric, Genung largely attempted to construct a theory of oratorical
persuasion from scratch. Most notably, the discussions of oratory, persuasion,
and argumentation nestle in short sections near the back of the books, clearly
subordinate to Genung‟s methodical discussion of writing style. In one sense,
Genung could be commended for discussing speech in a book about rhetoric. In
the context of his tradition, this alone may stand as a significant contribution.
Yet, he does not integrate his discussion of oratory with the discussion of
grammar and style in the larger part of his books. Although Genung perceived
differences between the oral and the written, the work as a whole clearly stresses
rhetoric as verbal expression. Thus, Genung‟s work stands in the tradition of
Blair and Campbell, but takes steps, perhaps tentative steps, toward the dramatic
resurgence of oratorical studies that was to arise in the United States in a few
years.
Works such as Genung‟s, which subordinated oratory to literature, and
did so without clear theoretical reason, set the stage for the dramatic resurgence
of oratorical theory and teaching that occurred in the United States during the
first three decades of the twentieth century. Lyon (1915) advocated “a clear-cut
division” between English and speech in universities (44). This may have, in part,
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been a rebellion against an approach that subordinated speech to literature.
Suggesting that college students be taught an extemporaneous method of
speaking, Robinson (1915) stated that “The boy must not be subjected to the
danger of falling back of [sic] those eighteenth-century models of composition
which he learned to follow in high school” (223). The time had come to rebuild
the theory of oral discourse on a new foundation. Nonetheless, Genung‟s
emphasis clearly endured in the continuing stress on naturalness and clarity of
expression. Genung pointed out the importance of analyzing and adapting to the
audience, even though he lacked tools to explain how to do so. He broke free of
the genres of Aristotle, thus opening the opportunity to examine the kinds of
speeches typical of North American culture. Thus, even after rhetoricians
returned to classical models, a uniquely North American approach to spoken
rhetoric had arrived.
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